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Evolution of the Command Responsibility Doctrine in
Light of the Celebici Decision of the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
I. Introduction
When the United Nations established a war crimes tribunal for
the former Yugoslavia in 1993,' international attention focused on
the laws of war and humanitarian concerns in a manner unseen
since the 1940s.2 Not since the post-World War II tribunals at
Nuremberg and Tokyo had an international court sat in judgment
of individuals for their conduct in the course of armed conflict.3
Among the multitude of legal topics revisited by the most recent
tribunals is the doctrine of superior-subordinate liability.
Generally speaking, this doctrine provides that a subordinate
cannot escape liability merely because he or she was following the
orders of a superior.4 Similarly, under certain circumstances, a
superior will be liable for the unlawful acts of a subordinate. 5 In
the military context, the latter situation is commonly referred to as
the command responsibility doctrine. 6 This term, and the liability
1The United Nations Security Council established the Yugoslavia tribunal in May
of 1993. See S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR,_ Sess.,_mtg., U.N. Doc. s/25626 (1993)
[following consideration of Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of
S. C. Res. 808, U.N. SCOR, 48h Sess.,_ mtg. at 56, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (1993)].
2 The tribunal for the former Yugoslavia is the first international war crimes
tribunal since the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals that followed the Second World War.
See infra notes 127-34 and accompanying text. The decisions of the World War II
tribunals led to an explosion in the codification of international laws of war, especially
those dealing with "humanitarian" issues. See infra notes 55-66 and accompanying text.
3 See infra notes 55-66.
4 See infra notes 69-70 and accompanying text. The "just following orders"
defense was made infamous in the United States by the actions of U.S. Army Lieutenant
Calley at My Lai during the Vietnam War. See U.S. v. Calley, 46 C.M.R. 1131 (1973).
5 See infra note 71 and accompanying text. The responsibility of a superior
actually encompasses two obligations: the first is liability for issuing an unlawful order
and the second is liability for failure to prevent or stop the commission of war crimes by
subordinates. See id. This Comment focuses only on the latter branch of the command
responsibility doctrine.
6 See W.J. Fenrick, Some International Law Problems Related to Prosecutions
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that follows it, may apply to both political or administrative
leaders, as well as military officers.7
In November of 1998, the International Criminal Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia8 (hereinafter ICTY) handed down a final
judgment in Prosecutorv. Delalic.9 This decision marks the first
time an alleged war criminal has been found guilty under the
command responsibility doctrine by an international tribunal since
the end of World War II. ° The ICTY held Zdravko Mucic, the
warden of the Celebici prison camp, responsible for the atrocious
treatment of prisoners by the camp guards." l The tribunal,
however, ultimately acquitted military commander Zejnil Delalic,
whose area of responsibility included the Celebici camp.12
This Comment focuses on the development of the command
responsibility doctrine as a part of international and domestic laws
of war. First, it briefly outlines the development of internationally
codified laws of war.'3
Next, this Comment discusses the
emergence of the command responsibility doctrine as a distinct
basis for liability in the prosecution of war crimes. 4 It then
focuses on the Celebici judgment, discussing the facts and
analyzing the Tribunal's bases for its decisions concerning
Before the InternationalCriminal Tribunalfor the Former Yugoslavia, 6

DUKE J. COMP.

& INT'L L. 103, 110 (1995).
7 See id.

The full name of the tribunal is the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of
Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law
Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991. See JOHN R.W.D.
JONES, THE PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS FOR THE FORMER
YUGOSLAVIA AND RWANDA

3 (1998).

9 See U.N. Judges Sentence Threefor War Crimes Against Bosnian Serbs, BOSTON
GLOBE, Nov. 17, 1998, at A29 [hereinafter "U.N. Judges Sentence Three"]. The full
name of the case is Prosecutor v. Delalic, et. al., (IT-96-21-T) (16 Nov. 1998)
[hereinafter "Celebici Judgment"]. The ICTY, however, often refers to a case by the
name of the prison camp involved. See The International Criminal Tribunalfor the
former
Yugoslavia.
Trial
Chambers
(visited
Mar.
21,
1999)
<http://www.un.org/icty/cases-te.htm>. In this case, the Celebici prison camp was a
Bosnian camp, located in the Konjic municipality in central Bosnia and Herzogovina,
used for the detention of Serbian prisoners. See Celebici Judgment at 46.
to See U.N. Judges Sentence Three, supra note 9.
1 See id.
2 See id.
11See infra notes 17-68 and accompanying text.
14

See infra notes 69-126 and accompanying text.
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command responsibility." Finally, this Comment compares the
Tribunal's recent decision with the historical concept of command
responsibility.

6

II. Development of the Command Responsibility Doctrine as
Part of the Laws of War
A. Evolution of the Laws of War
1. From Customs to Codes
Although international codification of laws of war did not take
place until the mid-nineteenth century, 7 many cultures have had
customary principles of war since ancient times.
One early
example is Sun-Tzu, a Chinese text over two thousand years old
that describes strategies for aggressive military action." Although
this book devotes most of its text to military tactics, certain
passages foreshadow modem laws of war:
"So, in chariot battles when chariots are captured, the tenchariot unit commander will reward the first to capture them and
will switch their battle standards and flags; their chariots are
mixed with 2ours
and driven; their soldiers are treated kindly when
0
given care.,
Similarly, Greek soldiers in the period from 700 to 450 B.C.

15
16

See infra notes 127-254 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 255-73 and accompanying text.

See Adam Roberts, Land Warfare: From Hague to Nuremberg, in THE LAWS OF
116, 119 (Michael Howard et
al. eds., 1994). Codification of international, as opposed to domestic, laws of war began
with the 1856 Paris Declaration on Maritime Law and continued with the 1868 Saint
Petersburg Declaration. See id.
17

WAR: CONSTRAINTS ON WARFARE IN THE WESTERN WORLD

18 See generally THE LAWS OF WAR: CONSTRAINTS ON WARFARE IN THE WESTERN

(Michael Howard et al. eds., 1994) (providing analysis of the laws of war from
classical Greek times, through medieval culture, early modem Europe, and colonial
America).
19 SUN-Tzu: THE NEW TRANSLATION 15, 22-23 (J.H. Huang trans., William
Morrow and Company 1993) (484-474 B.C.). Sun-Tzu is the book's original title,
following a custom in early China of naming a book after its author. See id. at 15.
However, at a later date it was renamed Sunzi bingfa, which translates into "The Art of
War." See id. at 25.
20 Id. at 46-47.
WORLD
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had unwritten, customary rules of engagement. 2' Among these
was the recognition of the noncombatant status of religious sites, a
practice that endures in the modem era: "[h]ostilities against
certain persons and in certain places are inappropriate: the
inviolability of sacred places and persons under protection of
22 the
respected.,
be
should
suppliants,
and
gods, especially heralds
The Chinese and Greek cultures yield just a small sample of
the customary rules of war that existed in ancient societies.23
Nonetheless, even until the mid-nineteenth century, laws of war
existed mainly as domestic regulations, military practices, and
religious principles. 24 Although individual countries may have had
their own methods for regulating warfare, the first sign of
international agreement began surfacing with the Declaration of
St. Petersburg, signed in 1868.25 The substance of the agreement
concerns a ban on certain types of projectiles; 26 however, the
declaration is famous today for its statements reflecting modem
concerns with the practice of increasingly sophisticated warfare.
The Preamble eloquently sets forth these concerns:

See Josiah Ober, ClassicalGreek Times, in THE LAWS OF WAR: CONSTRAINTS ON
12, 13 (Michael Howard et al. eds., 1994).
This type of protection for places bearing religious markers is
22 Id. at 13.
embodied in the modem Hague conventions. See Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the
Laws and Customs of War on Land, Annex (Regulations), Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277,
1Bevans 631 [hereinafter Hague Convention IV]. Article 27 of the Convention provides
that "all necessary steps must be taken to spare, as far as possible, buildings dedicated to
religion, art, science, or charitable purposes." Id. at 2203, 1 Bevans at 648.
23 See generally THE LAWS OF WAR: CONSTRAINTS ON WARFARE IN THE WESTERN
WORLD (Michael Howard et al. eds., 1994) (providing analysis of the laws of war from
classical Greek times through medieval culture, early modem Europe, and colonial
America).
24 See Roberts, supra note 17, at 119. One example of the United States' domestic
laws of war is General Order No. 100, known as the Lieber Code. This code formed the
framework for identifying war crimes violations during the American Civil War. See
Major William H. Parks, Command Responsibility for War Crimes, 62 MIL. L. REv. 1, 7
(1973). For example, Captain Henry Wirz, commandant of the infamous Confederate
prisoner of war camp at Andersonville, Georgia, was convicted and hung for violating
the Lieber Code for his mistreatment of Union prisoners. See id.
25 The Declaration of St. Petersburg, 1 A.J.I.L. (Supp.) 95-96 (1907), Nov. 29,
1868 [hereinafter The Declaration of St. Petersburg].
26 The declaration specifically banned "any projectile of less weight than fourhundred grammes, which is explosive, or is charged with fulminating or inflammable
substances." The Declaration of St. Petersburg, supranote 25, at 96.
21

WARFARE IN THE WESTERN WORLD
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[T]he progress of civilization should have the effect of
alleviating, as much as possible the calamities of war....
... [T]he only legitimate object which states should endeavor to

accomplish during war is to weaken the military force of the
enemy....
[T]his object would be exceeded by the employment of arms
which uselessly aggravate the sufferings of disabled men, or
render their death inevitable ... 27

Thirty years later, Czar Nicholas II and the Russian
government called for an international conference at The Hague to
discuss disarmament. 28
Although on its face The Hague
conference called for the avoidance of war, Russia's real concern
was with Western innovations in weaponry and warfare. 29 Thus,
the conference consisted of two bodies: a First Committee that
discussed the limitation of certain weapons, and a Second
Committee that worked on codifying laws of war.3° Although
publicly considered a failure in the area of disarmament,' the 1899
Hague Conference represented the first codification of
international laws of war.32 The 1899 Hague Convention on the
Law and Customs of War on Land, and the Convention on
Maritime War are the earliest examples of laws of war codified in
the form of a multinational treaty.33
This use of the multilateral treaty as a basis for international
rules and conventions on warfare continued with the second
Hague Peace Conference of 1907. 34 This conference adopted
thirteen conventions, ten of which dealt with laws of war.35 The
Hague Convention IV of 190736 specifically addressed land
27

Id. at 95.

28

See Roberts, supra note 17, at 119.

29

See id. at 120.

30 See

id. at 121.
id. According to one commentator, "the peace conference achieved nothing
in the field of disarmament and was thus dismissed as a complete failure by most of the
journalists covering it-an early example of the perennially poor coverage of the laws of
war in the press." Id.
32 See id.
31 See

33

See Roberts, supra note 17, at 121.

34 See

id. at 122.

35 See id.
36

See Hague Convention IV, supra note 22.
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warfare, and its standards were later incorporated into the military
manuals of individual nations.37 Thus, although the second Hague
Conference, like its predecessor, did not lead to any disarmament
among nations, the conventions it promulgated began to form a
basis for military training on the laws of war.38
2. The Nuremberg Effect
The next significant development in the evolution of
international laws of war came toward the end of the Second
World War.3 9 In August of 1944, the United States Army Office
of the Judge Advocate General (JAG) began ordering field
commanders to detain enemy soldiers and commanders who might
have committed war crimes. 40 Around the same time, the United
States was consulting with Great Britain and its allies to determine
how to deal with alleged war criminals.4 ' The result was the first
International Military Tribunal for the prosecution of war crimes,
better known as the Nuremberg trials.42 Indeed, the Nuremberg
trials are so famous that many mistakenly believe that these trials
were the source of modem laws of war. 3 Rather, the tribunal had
the task of taking the then-existing laws, both the customary
unwritten rules of engagement 44 and codified treaties such as the
Hague conventions,4 and applying them to the unique task of
4

37 See Roberts, supra note 17, at 122. The land warfare provisions of the Hague
Conventions found their way into the military manuals of both Great Britain and the
United States. See id.; BRITISH WAR OFFICE, III MANUAL OF MILITARY LAW (LAW OF
WAR ON LAND) (1958); U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL NO. 27-10, THE LAW OF
LAND WARFARE (1956) [hereinafter FM 27-10].
38See Roberts, supra note 17, at 122.
39 See generally TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS
(1992) (discussing the workings of the Nuremberg tribunal from the perspective of the
American Chief Counsel).

- See id. at 35.
See id. at 34-38.

41

42 See id. at 5. The tribunal held court and kept its Nazi prisoners in the German
city of Nuremberg. See id. at 61. Nuremberg prosecutor Telford Taylor comments that
the tribunal was "the most important and, I believe, successful new entity in the
enforcement of the laws of war." Id. at 5.
41 See id. at 5.
44

See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.

45 See supra notes 28-38 and accompanying text.

1999]

COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY DOCTRINE

173

prosecuting the Third Reich.46

Eventually the four delegations involved-the United States,
France, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union-came up with the
London Charter of the tribunal, named for the city in which it was
drafted. 47 Article Six of the charter enumerated the crimes over
which the tribunal would have jurisdiction, and divided these
crimes into three broad categories: Crimes Against Peace, War
Crimes, and Crimes Against Humanity. 48 The first category,
Crimes Against Peace, went beyond the scope of the St.
Petersburg Declaration 49 to make the waging of aggressive war a
crime in itself.50 The War Crimes category covered "violations of
the laws or customs of war," including such acts as "murder or illtreatment of prisoners of war . . . killing of hostages, plunder of
public or private property . . . or devastation not justified by

military necessity."'" Crimes Against Humanity addressed directly
the genocide issue, defining such crimes as murder, extermination,
enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed
against any civilian populations, before or during the war; or
persecutions on political, racial, or religious grounds in execution
of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the
Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the
country where perpetrated 2
46 See generally TAYLOR, supra note 39 (discussing the workings of the Nuremberg
tribunal from the perspective of the American Chief Counsel). Telford Taylor's account
of the establishment of the International Military Tribunal describes in detail the
responsibility facing the United States, France, Great Britain, and Russia in establishing
the first international war crimes tribunal. See id. Only months before the end of World
War II, Winston Churchill advocated gathering Nazi war criminals and summarily
executing them. See id. at 34. The subsequent decision to grant hearings to all
defendants, in an adversarial setting, brought forth a host of legal and political questions.
See id. at 50-55. Chief among these questions was how to avoid the ex post facto
problem involved in charging the German defendants with waging of aggressive war as a
crime. See id. at 51. Compounding these difficulties were procedural issues; namely,
the American adversarial system seemed foreign, if not entirely counterproductive, to
some of the other parties involved. See id. at 64.
47 See id. at 59-61.
48 See Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Aug. 8, 1945, art. 6
[hereinafter London Charter].
49 See supra note 25.
50 See London Charter, supra note 48, art.6.

51 Id.
52

See id.
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More than the London Charter's definition of war crimes, it
was the actual prosecution of the Nazi war criminals that set
significant precedents in the development of laws of war.53 Put
another way, the real impact of the Nuremberg tribunal was not in
the definition of war crimes, but in their application to criminal
defendants.54
3. Post World War H Developments

The atrocities of World War II brought war crimes, especially
those of humanitarian nature, into the international spotlight. The
result was an explosion in the codification of customs of warfare."
Of these codifications, some of the most influential ones have
been the Geneva Conventions of 1949." These four conventions
were promulgated by the International Committee of the Red
Cross, and voted upon and implemented by delegates from most
nations of the world. 7 Together, they form a stable base from
which twentieth century laws of war have evolved and matured.58
The Geneva Conventions deal mainly with humanitarian aspects
of warfare,
such as treatment of wounded soldiers in the field59 and2
60
•61•
at sea, prisoners of war,' and protection of civilians in wartime."
53 See Matthew Lippman, Conundrums of Armed Conflict: Criminal Defenses to
Violations of the HumanitarianLaw of War, 15 DICK. J. INT'L L. 1, 1 (1996).
5
See id. A full discussion of the actual prosecution of the various Nazi war
criminals is beyond the scope of this Comment. Naturally, much has been written on
this topic. See TAYLOR, supra note 39; see also ROBERT E. CONOT, JUSTICE AT
NUREMBERG (1983); ROBERT W. COOPER, THE NUREMBERG TRIAL (1947). Additionally,
the United Nations later issued a resolution formally recognizing the war crimes defined
by the London Charter. See Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter
of the Nuremberg Tribunaland in the Judgment of the Tribunal, U.N. GAOR, 5t' Sess.,
Supp. No. 12, at 11, U.N. Doc. A/1316 (1950) [hereinafter Nuremberg Principles].
55See Timothy L.H. McCormack, Selective Reaction to Atrocity: War Crimes and
the Development of InternationalCriminal Law, 60 ALB. L. REV. 681, 721 (1997). For
example, the United Nations, in its first session, adopted a resolution on genocide and
eventually developed a genocide convention. See id.
56 See infra notes 59-62 and accompanying text.

57

See

W. MICHAEL REISMAN AND CHRIS

T.

ANTONIou, THE LAWS OF WAR xxix

(1994).
58 See

id.

59Geneva Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded
and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3115 [hereinafter
Geneva Convention (I)].
6o Geneva Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick
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The Geneva conventions were signed just a few short years
after the end of World War II. The decades following, however,
saw the development of unprecedented types of warfare, including
guerilla tactics and internal, or non-international, conflicts.63 In the
late 1970s, the International Committee of the Red Cross sought to
address these changes by convening a new Geneva conference,
which eventually produced two additional protocols to the Geneva
Conventions. 6' Protocol I contained a controversial provision
classifying persons not in uniform, but carrying weapons during or
preceding an attack, as combatants. 61 Protocol I also reflected
post-Vietnam concerns for environmental preservation by
containing an article that prohibited use of weapons which may
damage the natural environment and prohibited destruction of the
environment as a means of reprisal.6 6
4. Summary
This broad overview of the development of laws of war has
been limited primarily to discussing the trend toward codification.
Factors completely separate from the formal treaty process have
also greatly influenced the customs of warfare. The influence of
the media in bringing atrocities into the international spotlight and
the resultant influence of public outcry are such examples.67
and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3219
[hereinafter Geneva Convention (II)].
61 Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3317 [hereinafter Geneva Convention (III)].
62 Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time
of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516 [hereinafter Geneva Convention (IV)].
63 See REISMAN, supra note 57, at xxix.
64 See id.
63 Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and relating
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, art. 44, 1125
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Protocol I]. Naturally, this provision was sympathetic to guerilla
fighters, affording them the rights of combatant status without the traditional requirement
of wearing distinctive military uniforms or carrying arms openly all the time. See
REISMAN, supra note 57, at 43-44. The blurring of the distinction between guerilla
fighters and the civilian population, however, can lead to greater civilian casualties. See
id. This concern has prevented many nations from becoming parties to Protocol I,
including the United States (which is also not a party to Protocol II). See id.
66 See Protocol I, supra note 65, art. 55.
67 See REISMAN, supra note 57, at xxiv.
For example, American journalists in
Vietnam had great control over the selection of images broadcast to the American public,
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Another example is the quality of instruction on laws of war given68
to soldiers and military officers in their initial training.
Nonetheless, the treaties and conventions provide concrete
documentation of the changing principles of warfare over time.
B. Emergence of the Doctrine of Command Responsibility
1. The Doctrine Defined
The command responsibility doctrine is unavoidably dualistic
in nature, for it concerns both the commander and the
subordinate. 6' Thus, it presents two sides of the coin-the
commander's responsibility for war crimes committed by a
subordinate, and the plea of the subordinate that he or she was
"acting in accordance with orders."7 °
Furthermore, the
commander's responsibility is twofold: commanders may be
directly liable for issuing illegal orders and may also be liable for
the unlawful acts of subordinates, if the commanders knew or
should have known about the illegal acts, but failed to prevent or
punish them.7' This Comment focuses on the latter aspect of a
commander's responsibility.
2. HistoricalDevelopments
The beginnings of the command responsibility doctrine can be
seen as far back as the time of Sun-Tzu. 7 During that time, the
primary focus was on the commander's duty to lead and control
those under his command.7 3 In that sense, a commander's liability
could flow not only from an improper order but also from failure
as well as the moral characterization of these images. See id.
68 See id. at xxvii. "It is patent that if those engaged in hostilities have not been
exposed to the prescriptions of the law of armed conflict, then they hardly can be
expected to comply with them." Id. For example, since the 1950s, the United States
Army has had a manual dedicated solely to the laws of war. See FM 27-10, supra note
37.
69 See L.C. Green, Symposium: International Criminal Law: Command
Responsibility in InternationalHumanitarianLaw, 5 TRANSNT'L L. & CONTP. PRBS. 319,

320 (1995).
70 See id.
71 See id.

72 See Parks, supra note 24, at 2, 3; supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
73 See Parks, supra note 24, at 4. Note that the use of the male gender to indicate
the commander is solely in keeping with the historical context.
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to properly lead or control his troops by allowing them to commit
unlawful acts.74
The development of laws of war in the United States
demonstrates how the command responsibility doctrine gradually
took shape over the last two hundred years.75 For example,
scarcely a few months after the signing of America's Declaration
of Independence, the American Articles of War were enacted.76
Among their provisions, the Articles required military officers to
keep their troops in "good order," and provided that officers who
failed to punish the misconduct of their soldiers could themselves
be punished for the offenses committed. 77
Perhaps the first international recognition of the command
responsibility doctrine occurred in the Hague Convention IV of
1907." This convention, which dealt with land warfare, defined
lawful combatants in part as being commanded by a responsible
superior.79 One of the command responsibilities designated by the
Hague Convention IV is insuring "public order and safety" in
areas occupied by military troops.8° Most significantly, the
provisions of the convention hold belligerent nations responsible
for the acts of their armed forces. 8' This obligation foreshadows
the modem notion of holding heads of state accountable under the
command responsibility doctrine.
Despite the Hague
Conventions of 1907, however, World War I failed to see any
major war crime prosecutions of military commanders for acts in
M

74 See id.
75
76

See id. at 5-10.
See id. at 5 (citing the American Articles of War, sec. IX, Sept. 20, 1776).

See id. The Articles addressed misconduct such as "iots," "abuses," and
"disorders." Id. An example of such misconduct includes stealing the officers' whiskey
and straggling on road marches; as a militia captain during the Black Hawk War,
Abraham Lincoln was court-martialed for failing to prevent these types of misconduct.
See id. at 6. His punishment was to wear a wooden sword for two days. See id.
78 See Fenrick, supra note 6, at 112; supra note 22.
77

79 See Fenrick, supra note 6, at 113; Hague Convention IV, supra note 22, art. I,
36 Stat. at 2295, 1 Bevans at 643-44.
8oFenrick, supra note 6, at 113; Hague Convention IV, supra note 22, art. 43, 36
Stat. at 2306-08, 1 Bevans at 651-53.

81See Hague Convention IV, supra note 20, art. 3, 36 Stat. at 2296, 1 Bevans at
644; Green, supra note 69, at 325.
82 See Green, supra note 69, at 329.
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violation of the laws of war."
3. Post-World War H Developments
Toward the end of World War II, the Allied powers faced two
problems: how to punish Nazi crimes against Jews that took place
before World War II, and how to deal with potentially thousands
of Nazi defendants who might be responsible for these and other
crimes. 8" Murray Bernays, a United States Army Colonel and
lawyer, came up with the idea of charging Nazi organizations and
their leaders with criminal conspiracy."
This way, these
defendants could be charged not only with actual violations of the
laws of war, but with the act of conspiring to commit these
violations in the pre-war period.8 6 Thus, the war crimes committed
against German Jews before the outbreak of the war could be
punished as "preparatory conduct."87 Furthermore, the conspiracy
charges could also resolve the difficulty of indicting the vast
number of potential defendants.8 Once an organization was
convicted of being part of the conspiracy, proof of membership in
the organization alone could be enough to convict an individual. "9
Nevertheless, Bemays' conspiracy idea was not adopted in its
entirety into the London Charter.9° Rather, the conspiracy theory

83

See id. at 324.

See TAYLOR, supra note 39, at 35. The problem with addressing the prewar
crimes was that they were potentially outside the jurisdiction of the Nuremberg tribunal.
See id. Additionally, the number of potential defendants, "numbered in six or seven
figures, a ghoulish embarras de richesses." Id. at 36. It would have been timeconsuming to try these defendants individually and difficult to obtain the necessary
evidence. See id. at 35.
85See id. at 35.
84

86 See
87

id. at 36.

Id. at 36.

88 See id.

89See id. Admittedly, the "guilt by association" theory had little precedent in
American law and to modern eyes may seem to controvert American ideals of civil
liberties. See id. at 41. Telford Taylor points out, however, that "it is difficult for many
of today's readers to grasp the utter hatred of the SS which its actions had spread
throughout the Western world, especially during the last two years of the war, when
there was incontrovertible proof of the wholesale massacre of Jews." Id. at 41-42.
Indeed, Bernays' plan was "far less arbitrary or draconian" than other proposals of how
to deal with Nazi war criminals, including execution. Id.; see also supra note 46.
goSee TAYLOR, supra note 39, at 76. The London Charter functioned as the statute
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was applied only to the charge of Crimes Against Peace, as a
conspiracy of the European Axis to wage aggressive war. 9 Once
limited to this charge alone, the conspiracy theory became too
weak to encompass the pre-war harassment of German Jews by
Nazis. 92 Eventually, the Nuremberg tribunal found that there was
no single conspiracy to wage an aggressive war, but many separate
plans to do so.93
Despite the failure to obtain a conviction based on a Nazi
conspiracy, the conspiracy idea represents a significant step in the
evolution of the command responsibility doctrine. Article 6 of the
London Charter contains the following language: "Leaders,
organizers, instigators and accomplices participating in the
formulation or execution of a common plan or conspiracy to
commit any of the foregoing crimes are responsible for all acts
performed by any persons in execution of such plan." 94
Article 7 of the London Charter continues: "The official
position of defendants, whether as Heads of State or responsible
officials in Government Departments, shall not be considered as
freeing them from responsibility or mitigating punishment." 95
From this language, one can infer the following propositions:
1. Government leaders could be held responsible for
conspiring to engage in aggressive war, even if they did no
specific acts in furtherance of the waging of war;
2. Leaders and organizers could be charged for the crimes of
subordinates committed in following the leaders' order;
3. Government officials could not declare themselves immune
from punishment by virtue of their political position.
96

of the tribunal, from which the famous Nuremberg Principles later developed. See supra
notes 47-54 and accompanying text.
9' See id.; London Charter, supra note 48, art. 6(a).
92 See TAYLOR, supranote 39, at 76.
93 See id. at 582.
It must be remembered that "conspiracy" was an AngloAmerican doctrine that was met with distaste by the European lawyers working on the
tribunal. See id. This distaste may explain why the tribunal failed to give the conspiracy
charge the broad scope advocated by American prosecutors. See id.
94

See London Charter, supra note 48, art. 6.

9s Id. art. 7.
96 The Anglo-American crime of conspiracy, upon which Bernays based his
formulation of conspiracy charges, is defined as an agreement to do an unlawful act, or a
lawful act by unlawful means. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.03(1) (1962). It is not
required that the act actually be committed. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.03(5) (1962).
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These propositions deal mainly with a commander's
responsibility for issuing an unlawful order. 97 The London Charter
did not deal specifically with command responsibility as it relates
to the failure to prevent or punish unlawful acts of subordinates,
mainly because the Nazi defendants at Nuremberg could be held
directly liable for their participation in wartime atrocities. 9
A post-World War II trial that provides a somewhat
controversial modem application of the command responsibility
doctrine is that of Japanese General Tomoyuki Yamashita. 99
General Yamashita served as commander of Japanese forces in the
Philippines from October 9, 1944, until his surrender on
September 3, 1945.'00 During this time the soldiers under General
Yamashita's ultimate command were alleged to have committed
atrocities against both United States soldiers in the Philippines and
Filipinos.'0° The Military Commission appointed to try General
Yamashita after his capture convicted him for violating laws of
war and sentenced him to death by hanging. 0 2

Yamashita's

specific charge was that,
While commander of armed forces of Japan at war with the
United States of America and its allies, [he had] unlawfully
disregarded and failed to discharge his duty as commander to
control the operations of the members of his command,
permitting them to commit brutal atrocities and other high
crimes against people of the United States and of its allies and
dependencies, particularly the Philippines; and he . . . thereby

violated the laws of war.103
This charge did not allege that Yamashita ordered the
commission of atrocities or that he personally committed
atrocities. Rather, the court based liability on Yamashita's failure
to act, which was characterized as a breach of his duty as a

98

97 See

supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
See Fenrick, supra note 6, at 112.

99

See In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946).

loo See id. at 31, 33.
lo, See id.
102 See

id. at 5. Following the Military Commission's sentence, the United States
Supreme Court granted judicial review over the power of the commission to try General
Yamashita for his alleged crimes. See id. at 8.
103 Id.

at 13-14.
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commander to control his troops. 04 The United States Supreme
Court acknowledged that precedent for imposing such a duty
existed in the Hague Convention IV of 1907.'05 As to whether
such a duty applies to a military commander under attack by
invading forces, '°6 the Court stated in dicta:
It is evident that the conduct of military operations by troops
whose excesses are unrestrained by the orders or efforts of their
commander would almost certainly result in violations which it
is the purpose of the law of war to prevent. Its purpose to protect
civilian populations and prisoners of war from brutality would
largely be defeated if the commander of an invading army could
with impunity neglect to take reasonable measures for their
protection. Hence the law of war presupposes that its violation is
to be avoided through the control of the operations of war by
commanders who are to some extent responsible for their
subordinates.'° 7
Thus,
although the Court could neither create a new law of
108
war
nor point to an exact precedent for the Yamashita
situation," it was able to extrapolate a duty to control based on the
purposes of the laws of war." In reaffirming the validity of the
actions of the military commission that tried Yamashita, the
Supreme Court further helped establish not only the duty of the
commander, but also his liability for violating a law of war for
failing to properly discharge this duty."'
See id.
-05See id. at 15-16; see also supra notes 78-82 and accompanying text.

-

The alleged atrocities that occurred
06 See In re Yamashita 327 U.S. 1, 32 (1946).
under General Yamashita's command took place during MacArthur's invasion of the
Philippines. See id.
Id. at 15.
-

lo8 See id. at 16. "We do not make the laws of war but we respect them so far as
they do not conflict with the commands of Congress or the Constitution." Id.
lo9See id. at 15-16. The conventions that the majority cited established a basis for
finding a commander's duty to lead troops, see that laws of war are obeyed, and insure
the safety of civilians. See id. However, none of the laws cited provided that a
commander who failed to prevent his troops from committing violations could be
punished as if he had so committed them. See id.
io See id. at 15.
il See id. at 16 ("[The Hague Conventions] plainly imposed on petitioner ... an
affirmative duty to take such measures as were within his power and appropriate in the
circumstances to protect prisoners of war and the civilian population."); Parks, supra
note 24, at 37.
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In his dissent in Yamashita, Justice Murphy made an
impassioned argument that the charge against General Yamashita
lacked legal precedent. 1 2 Many believe Justice Murphy's dissent
in Yamashita argued against a strict liability standard for military
commanders." 3 At least one commentator, however, reasons that
Justice Murphy's position may be characterized as an objection to
charging a commander with failure to properly control his troops
after the accusing party had effectively defeated the commander
and cut off his lines of communication.1 4 Although the parties in
this case may have been sharply divided over the procedural and
evidentiary issues," 5 the command responsibility doctrine as
defined in Yamashita was to become more accepted in the latter
half of the twentieth century.
4. Modern Permutations:The ICTY's Definition
Although Yamashita fleshed out the command responsibility
doctrine as it pertained to liability for failure to act, many
questions remained unresolved. One important issue was the mens
rea required of the accused commander. The first international
treaty to codify the command responsibility doctrine after World
War II was Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 1949.16
112 Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 28 (Murphy, J., dissenting). He was not charged with
personally participating in the acts of atrocity or with ordering or condoning their
commission. Not even knowledge of these crimes was attributed to him. It was simply
alleged that he unlawfully disregarded and failed to discharge his duty as commander to
control the operations of the members of his command, permitting them to commit the
acts of atrocity. The recorded annals of warfare and the established principles of
international law afford not the slightest precedent for such a charge. Id.
113 See Fenrick, supra note 6, at 114.
114 See Parks, supra note 24, at 35-36; see also Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 34-35
(Murphy, J., dissenting). Justice Murphy put it succinctly:

Nothing in all history or in international law, at least as far as I am aware,
justifies such a charge against a fallen commander of a defeated force. To use
the very inefficiency and disorganization created by the victorious forces as the
primary basis for condemning officers of the defeated armies bears no
resemblance to justice or to military reality.
Id. at 35.
115See Fenrick, supra note 6, at 114.
See Protocol I, supra note 65, art. 86; Timothy Wu and Yong-Sung Kang,
Criminal Liability for the Actions of Subordinates - the Doctrine of Command
Responsibility and its Analogues in United States Law, 38 HARV. INT'L L.J. 272, 276
(1997).
116
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Protocol I, article 86, states:
1. The High Contracting Parties and the Parties to the conflict
shall repress grave breaches, and take measures necessary to
suppress all other breaches, of the Conventions or of this
Protocol which result from a failure to act when under a duty to
do so.
2. The fact that a breach of the Conventions or of this
Protocol was committed by a subordinate does not absolve his
superiors from penal or disciplinary responsibility, as the case
may be, if they knew, or had information that should have
enabled them to conclude in the circumstances at the time, that

he was committing or was going to commit such a breach and if
they did not take all feasible measures within their power to
prevent or repress the breach.'

The second paragraph above indicates that the mens rea for
command responsibility is not strict liability. Rather, it is based
on either actual knowledge or knowledge implied from the
circumstances, given the information the commander had access
to. It appears that actual or implied knowledge under Protocol I
triggers a commander's duty to act "feasibly," and "within [his]
power," to prevent the subordinate from committing a war
crime.l"'
The influence of Protocol I became apparent two decades later
when the U.N. adopted the Statute of the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia." 9 Article 7, section 3 of that
statute specifically covers the command responsibility doctrine. "0
In some respects, the language of the ICTY Statute is clearer
than Protocol I. Rather than requiring a superior to take "all

117Protocol I, supra note 65, at 42-43 (emphasis added).
118

Id.

"9 S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV.3217
(1993) [approving the Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of S. C.
Res. 808, U.N. SCOR, 48" Sess., U.N. Doc. S/25704 and ADD.I (1993)] [Hereinafter
ICTY Statute].
120 ICTY Statute, supra note 119, art. 7, sec. 3. The fact that any of the acts referred
to in articles 2 to 5 of the present Statute were committed by a subordinate does not
relieve his superior of criminal responsibility if he knew or had reason to know that the
subordinate was about to commit such acts or had done so and the superior failed to take
the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators

thereof. See id.
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feasible measures within [his] power," 2 the statute requires more
objective "necessary and reasonable measures."'2 2 Furthermore,
the mens rea standard is couched in standard legal terminology:
"knew or had reason to know."' 23 Again, this language suggests
that the mens rea requirement of the command responsibility
doctrine may be either actual or constructive knowledge.
The Commission of Experts on the Former Yugoslavia
elaborates the level of mens rea required to trigger the command
responsibility doctrine. 24 This report suggests a third type of mens
rea, distinct from actual or constructive knowledge, in which a
commander can be held responsible for the actions of his
subordinates. This standard, enumerated in section (b) in the
excerpt above, would prohibit a25 commander from taking
advantage of his "willful blindness."'
5. Summary
The command responsibility doctrine developed over the years
from ancient principles to modem international treaties. The
Yamashita case identified some troubling aspects in applying the
doctrine, especially when the outcome seems to base the
commander's responsibility on a theory of strict liability.
Although commentators are divided over whether Yamashita
actually set a strict liability standard, the command responsibility
doctrine in the ICTY Statute has rejected that standard by
requiring a mens rea component of "knew or had reason to know."

121 Protocol

I, supra note 65, art. 86.

122

ICTY Statute, supra note 119, art. 7, sec. 3.

123

Id.

124U.N.S.C, Letter Dated 24 May 1994 from the Secretary General to the President
of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/1994/673, at 16-17 (1994).
It is the view of the Commission that the mental element necessary

is (a) actual knowledge, (b) such serious personal dereliction on the
part of the commander as to constitute willful and wanton disregard
of the possible consequences, or (c) an imputation of constructive
knowledge, that is, despite pleas to the contrary, the commander,
under the facts and circumstances of the particular case, must have
known of the offenses charged and acquiesced therein.
Id.
125

See Wu, supra note 116, at 287.
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III. Application of the Command Responsibility Doctrine in
the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: The
Celebici Judgment
A. Overview of the ICTY
A complete discussion of the issues surrounding the
establishment of the ICTY is beyond the scope of this Comment,
but a basic overview of the formation and workings of the
Tribunal is helpful. The Security Council of the U.N. resolved in
1993 to create an international tribunal to adjudicate human rights
breaches that occurred in the former Yugoslavia.'26 The ICTY
differs from the Nuremberg tribunal in at least two significant
aspects. First, the United Nations, a community of nations that
were not parties to the Bosnian conflict, created the ICTY.'27 This
avoided the criticism after the Nuremberg tribunal; that the
tribunal dealt "victor's justice" to a vanquished enemy.' Second,
the United Nations established the ICTY during the Bosnian
conflict so that the Tribunal could be used to further the peace
process between the warring ethnic groups.'29 Indeed, the Security
Council based its authority to convene the Tribunal upon this goal
of furthering peace.' 3° Chapter VII of the United Nations' charter
concerns action to be taken relative to threats to peace and acts of
aggression.13' Article 39 calls upon the Security Council to
"decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles
41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and
security."'32 Article 41 enables the Council to take "measures not
involving the use of armed force," and lists some non-exclusive

126 See ICTY Statute, supra note 120. The Tribunal's jurisdiction extends only over
crimes "committed in the territory of former Yugoslavia which represents the former
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia," and committed after January 1, 1991. KARINE

LESCURE AND FLORENCE TRINTIGNAC, INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE FOR FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
17 (1996).
127

See LESCURE, supra note 126, at 3-4.

28

See id.

129

See id.

130

See id. at 6.

131

U.N. CHARTER ch. VII.

132

U.N. CHARTER art. 39, para 1.
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means of establishing peace.'33 These Articles formed the
34 basis of
Tribunal.'
the
establish
to
decision
Council's
the Security
Two lower courts (Trial Chambers I and II) and a Court of
Appeals comprise the ICTY.'35 The judges and prosecutor come
from a variety of nations, including South Africa, Australia, the
United States, China, and Canada.'3 6 Both ratione loci and ratione
temporis limit the Tribunal's jurisdiction to crimes committed in
the former Yugoslavia (land, air, and territorial waters) since
January 1, 1991.' 37
B. FactualBackground of the Celebici Judgment
Several aspects make the Celebici Judgment unusual. First,
the ICTY obtained its first conviction of a Bosnian Croat and
Bosnian Muslims for atrocities committed against Bosnian
Serbs.138 Second, the decision represented the first time the ICTY
found a defendant guilty of rape and classified it as a war crime. '9
Finally, the Celebici case was the first international judgment
II holding a superior liable for the crimes of his
since World War
40
subordinates.
The trial concerned actions taken in 1992 at the Celebici prison
camp, located in the Konjic municipality.' 4' Bosnian Croat and
Muslim forces invaded Konjic and used the barracks and
warehouses at Celebici to house Serbian prisoners. 1 In describing
the overall nature of Celebici, the Tribunal stated "that an
atmosphere of fear and intimidation prevailed at the prison-camp,
inspired by the beatings meted out indiscriminately4 3 upon the
prisoners' arrest, transfer to the camp and their arrival."'
The Tribunal tried four defendants concurrently for atrocities
42

'33

Id. at art. 41.

134

See LESCURE, supra note 126, at 6.

See id. at 14.
136See id. at 14-15.

'35

'37

See id. at 17-18.

138

See U.N. Judges Sentence Three, supra note 9.

139See id.
,MoSee id.
'4'

See Celebici Judgment, supra note 9, at 38.
id. at 56.

142 See
143

Id. at 59-60.
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committed at Celebici: Zejnil Delalic, Zdravko Mucic, Hazim
Delic and Esad Landzo.' 4 Esad Landzo, the youngest of the
defendants,14 worked as a guard at the prison camp. 46 Mucic was
the alleged commander of the camp, and Delic was his deputy
commander until Mucic's departure in November of 1992, at
which time Delic became commander. 147 Delalic was commander
of the military forces in the Konjic area and was alleged to have
authority over the Celebici camp.148 Of the defendants, only Delic,
Mucic, and Delalic were charged under the command
responsibility doctrine. 49 Thus, the following discussion deals
only with their charges.
C. Command Responsibility as Applied in the Celebici
Judgment
In the Celebici Judgment, the ICTY lists the elements of
command responsibility as follows:
(i) the existence of a superior-subordinate relationship;
(ii) the superior knew or had reason to know that the criminal
act was about to be or had been committed; and
(iii) the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable
measures to prevent the criminal act or punish the perpetrator
thereof. 5 0
These three elements summarize the language in Article 7,
section 3 of the statute, which deals with superior-subordinate
liability. 1"' Nonetheless, both the prosecution and defense in the
Celebici case had the opportunity to argue their proposed
interpretation of the command responsibility doctrine.
The
prosecution contended that the elements of the command
responsibility doctrine should be that the superior exercise direct
and/or indirect command or control over the subordinates who

1- See id. at 1.
145 See

id. at 3. Landzo was born in 1973 and was nineteen years old during the
events in question. See id.
1

See id.

147

See id. at 6.

148

See id. at 9.

149

See id. at 3.

- Id. at 128.
15, See ICTY Statute, supra note 119, art. 7, sec. 3.
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commit serious violations of international humanitarian law; the
superior must know or have reason to know that these acts were
about to be committed, or had been committed, even before he
assumed control; and the superior must fail to take the reasonable
measures within his power or at his disposal, to prevent or punish
these subordinates for these offences.' 52 By including those who
exercised de facto control over the Celebici camp, which allows
even informal commanders to fall within the doctrine, the53
prosecution desired an expanded definition of "superior."'
Furthermore, element (2) put forth by the prosecution interpreted
the "reason to know" mens rea requirement to encompass
superiors who were derelict in their duty to supervise, and thereby
failed to inform themselves of possible violations of the laws of
154
war.
The defense countered this characterization by putting forth
five factors to consider in determining command responsibility:
(1) The status of the accused as a commander or a civilian
exercising the equivalent of military command authority over a
person who committed a violation of the law of war;
(2) That a violation of the law of war actually occurred or was
about to occur;
(3) That the commander had either actual knowledge of the
commission of the violation of the law of war or that the
152 See Celebici Judgment, supra note 9, at 127. The elements of the command
responsibility doctrine, as contended by the prosecution, are as follows:

(1)The superior must exercise direct and/or indirect command or control
whether de jure and/or de facto, over the subordinates who commit serious
violations of international humanitarian law, and/or their superiors.
(2) The superior must know or have reason to know, which includes ignorance
resulting from the superior's failure to properly supervise his subordinates, that
these acts were about to be committed, or had been committed, even before he
assumed command and control.
(3) The superior must fail to take the reasonable and necessary measures, that
are within his power, or at his disposal in the circumstances, to prevent or
punish these subordinates for these offences.
Id.
53See id. at 129. The prosecution asserted that the authority of the superior over
the subordinate could take many forms, including "operationally, tactically,
administratively, executively in territories under the control of the superiors, and even
through influence." Id.
154 See id. at 145.
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commander had knowledge enabling him to conclude that the laws
of war had been violated;
(4) That the commander failed to act reasonably in suppressing
violations by investigating allegations and punishing perpetrators
or by taking action to prevent future violations;
And that the commander's failure to act was the cause of the
war crime that actually was committed.'55
Naturally, the defense desired a stricter mens rea requirement,
limited to either actual knowledge of the war crime, or actual
possession of information that would put the superior on notice
that the crime had been committed. 6 Furthermore, the defense
introduced a causation element: that omission by the superior be
the cause of the actual violation.'57 Applying these five elements
in lieu of the three put forth by the prosecution would likely result
in fewer superiors being found liable.
In discussing which elements of command responsibility to
apply to the facts before it, the ICTY emphasized that the
prosecution had properly distilled the doctrine into three
elements.'58 Subsequently, the tribunal discussed each of the
requirements in turn, starting with the existence of a superiorsubordinate relationship. 5 9
The tribunal agreed with the
prosecution that de facto commanders could be liable under the
command responsibility doctrine, especially given the breakdown
in formal, legal command structures caused by the nature of the
conflict in the former Yugoslavia.'6 ° The tribunal stated that it
looked more to authority, as embodied in the ability to control the
action of subordinates, rather than the formal status of an
individual as a commander, in determining the existence of a
superior-subordinate relationship. 6 ' Nonetheless, the tribunal was
careful to note "that the doctrine of superior responsibility extends
to civilian superiors only to the extent that they exercise a degree
of control over their subordinates which is similar to that of

"55

See id. at 128.

See id.

1356
157

See id.

issSee id. at 128.
159See id.
16o See id. at 139-40.
161

See id.
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military commanders."' 62
Next, the tribunal addressed the mens rea element of the
command responsibility doctrine. The tribunal recognized, as did
both the defense and the prosecution, that actual knowledge of war
crimes would be sufficient to trigger a superior's duty to take
reasonable measures to prevent or punish them. 163 Furthermore,
the tribunal elaborated on the standard of proof required in finding
that a superior had actual knowledge of the commission of war
crimes by subordinates.' 64 First, the tribunal acknowledged that
direct evidence was admissible to make a finding of actual
knowledge. 165 Additionally, the tribunal noted that circumstantial
evidence was also admissible, and provided non-exclusive
examples of circumstantial
evidence that could permit a finding of
66
actual knowledge.
The tribunal also considered the more controversial issue of
whether a mens rea standard short of actual knowledge could
trigger command responsibility. 1 7
After considering the
arguments of both the defense and the prosecution, 6 the tribunal
concluded that "a superior can be held criminally responsible only
if some specific information was in fact available to him which
would provide notice of offences committed by his
subordinates."'' 69 Thus, the tribunal rejected the prosecution's
contention that ignorance resulting from a failure to supervise

162

Id. at 140.

163 See

id. at 142.

164 See

id. at 142-44.
id. at 142.

165 See

166 See id. at 143-44.
following:

The twelve factors listed by the tribunal included the

(a) The number of illegal acts; (b) The type of illegal acts; (c) The scope of
illegal acts; (d) The time during which the illegal acts occurred; (e) The number
and type of troops involved; (f) The logistics involved, if any; (g) The
geographical location of the acts; (h) The widespread occurrence of the acts; (i)
The tactical tempo of operations; (j)
The modus operandi of similar illegal acts;
(k) The officers and staff involved; (1)The location of the commander at the
time.
Id.
167

See id. at 140.

168 See
169

id. at 140-42.

Id. at 146 (emphasis added).
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could trigger a superior's liability."0 Nonetheless, the tribunal was
careful to note that willful blindness was no excuse; once a
superior had information providing him notice of war crimes, he
could not choose to simply disregard that information."'
After a brief discussion of the definition of "necessary and
reasonable measures" as it pertains to command responsibility,"'
the tribunal addressed the defense's assertion of the necessity of a
causation element.7 7
The tribunal essentially rejected this
additional element, concluding that the prosecution need not show
that a superior's failure to act caused the commission of a war

170 See id. at 141-42. The tribunal noted that it was under an obligation to apply the
law as it existed at the time the alleged offenses were committed. See id. at 145.
Accordingly, the tribunal looked to the language of Article 86 of Protocol I Additional to
the Geneva Conventions for guidance on the "reason to know" standard of command
responsibility. See id.; Protocol I, supra note 65. Examining the language of this
Protocol, the tribunal concluded that it requires that commanders "in fact" have some
knowledge available to them. See Celebici Judgment, supra note 9, at 146.
'7' See Celebici Judgment, supra note 9, at 144 ("the Trial Chamber takes as its
point of departure the principle that a superior is not permitted to remain willfully blind
to the acts of his subordinates."). Note, however, that the tribunal distinguished the
"willful blindness" situation from that of General Yamashita. See supra notes 99-115
and accompanying text. Part of General Yamashita's dereliction of duty involved his
lack of knowledge of crimes being committed by his subordinates. See id. Under the
ICTY's formulation, however, this would not have been a sufficient mens rea to find
General Yamashita liable as a commander:
There can be no doubt that a superior who simply ignores information within his
actual possession compelling the conclusion that criminal offences are being
committed, or are about to be committed, by his subordinates commits a most
serious dereliction of duty for which he may be held criminally responsible
under the doctrine of superior responsibility. Instead, uncertainty arises in
relation to situations where the superior lacks such information by virtue of his
failure to properly supervise his subordinates.

Celebici Judgment, supra note 9, at 144 (emphasis added).
172 Celebici judgment, supra note 9, at 147.
The tribunal acknowledged that no
bright-line test could be established to determine what "necessary and reasonable"
means; the evaluation must be fact-specific: "[A]ny evaluation of the action taken by a
superior to determine whether this duty has been met is so inextricably linked to the factsof each particular situation that any attempt to formulate a general standard in abstracto
would not be meaningful." Id. The tribunal did note, however, that it could only impose
a duty upon commanders to do what is "within his material possibility": "It must,
however, be recognised that international law cannot oblige a superior to perform the
impossible." Id.
173

See id. at 148.
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crime by a subordinate. 74 Although the tribunal conceded that
some element of causation exists when a superior fails to prevent
the commission of a crime,'75 requiring proof of causation would
be logically incompatible with holding a superior responsible for
failing to punish subordinates who have already violated laws of
war. 76 Therefore, to establish liability under the command
responsibility doctrine, the prosecution need only prove the
superior-subordinate relationship, 177 the requisite knowledge
(actual or constructive),17 and the superior's failure to act. 1
79

D. Superior Responsibility of Hazim Delic
In discussing the criminal liability of each defendant, the
tribunal first examined whether those defendants charged with
superior responsibility met the three-part test outlined above. 8°
After deciding whether superior responsibility existed, the tribunal
determined the criminal liability for each of the detailed offenses
alleged against each of the defendants.' 8
The indictment charged Hazim Delic both with direct
responsibility for crimes in which he was an alleged participant
and with superior responsibility for crimes committed while he
served as deputy commander and, -later, as commander of
174

See id. The tribunal stated that

[C]ausation has not traditionally been postulated as a conditio sine qua non for
the imposition of criminal liability on superiors for their failure to prevent or
punish offences committed by their subordinates. Accordingly, the Trial
Chamber has found no support for the existence of a requirement of proof of
causation as a separate element of superior responsibility, either in the existing
body of case law, the formulation of the principle in existing treaty law, or, with
one exception, in the abundant literature on this subject.
Id.
75 See id. ("[Tihe superior may be considered to be causally linked to the offences,
in that, but for his failure to fulfil his duty to act, the acts of his subordinates would not
have been committed.").
176 See id. at 149 ("[N]o such casual link can possibly exist between an offence
committed by a subordinate and the subsequent failure of a superior to punish the
perpetrator of that same offence.").
177 See id. at 128; supra notes 159-62 and accompanying text.
78

See Celebici Judgment, supra note 9, at 128.

179

See id.

180

See id. at 215.

181See

id.
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Celebici. ' To support these charges, the prosecution contended
that Delic, in his role as deputy commander, had the authority of
the full commander in the latter's absence.'83 Furthermore, the
prosecution argued that Delic had authority over the prison guards
and the ability to punish or prevent their criminal acts and that he
failed to do so because he also participated in these acts.18 4 As
proof of his status as a superior within the camp hierarchy, the
prosecution noted that Delic was responsible for administrative
matters in the camp."'
In response to these allegations, the defense contended that the
prosecution failed to distinguish between the concepts of
"command" and "rank."' 86 Namely, the defense asserted that
superior responsibility attaches only by virtue of a position of
command. 7 Indeed, deputy commanders like Delic, while perhaps
higher in "rank" than another soldier, was not in the actual chain
of command.'88 Thus, the defense argued Delic could only have
been a conduit to transfer orders from the commander and lacked
the true authority to have superior responsibility.'89
182 See id. at 6-8. Delic was alleged to have directly participated in the beating
deaths of several individuals. See id. Further, he was alleged to have raped two women
and to have tortured at least two individuals with electric devices. See id. at 7. The
crimes allegedly committed by his subordinates include beating or shooting to death
eight prisoners, placing a prisoner in a manhole for a week without food or water,
placing a burning fuse around the genitals of another prisoner, and forcing persons to
commit fellatio upon each other. See id. at 9-11.
183, See id. at 281 ("[T]he Prosecution asserts that [the camp commander] was often
absent from the prison-camp. It is alleged that the evidence shows that when [the camp
commander] was absent, Hazim Delic was in charge and exercised full authority, that is,
he was the acting commander in [the camp commander's] absence.").
18 See id.

See id. Administrative matters include "organizing documents and logistics."
Id. at 280.
186 See id.at 283. The defense "contend[ed] that command is a right exercised by
virtue of office, the key elements of which are authority and responsibility. Military
rank, on the other hand, is characterised as the relative position or degree of precedence
granted military persons marking their stations in military life." Id.
185

187See id.
188 See id.

189See Celebicijudgment, supra note 9, at 283-84. In addition to this argument, the
defense asserted that the prosecution failed to meet its factual burden of proof. See id.
The defense argued that Delic's criminal liability could be determined only relative to
that of Mucic, his commander, and that absent proof of Mucic's liability, the prosecution
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The tribunal recognized that the prosecution was not asserting
that Delic could be held responsible even if he did not command
anyone, but rather, that Delic could be responsible even while
Therefore, the tribunal
lacking formal command status.' 9°
proceeded under the de facto command doctrine and inquired as to
whether the prosecution had met its factual burden in proving that
Delic exercised command authority over the Celebici prison
guards.' 9' First, the tribunal acknowledged the testimony of
several eyewitnesses who stated that Delic appeared to be the
"boss" of the guards.' 92 Nonetheless, the tribunal conceded that this
alone was not sufficient evidence of Delic's authority.1 93 Second,
the tribunal considered additional eyewitness testimony from
former prisoners, who testified to seeing Delic give orders and
exercise apparent influence, possibly through coercion and
intimidation, over the prison guards.' 94 Still, the tribunal felt this
evidence was not dispositive and went on to examine the acts and
responsibilities of Delic in his role as deputy commander.' 95 The
evidence tended to show that Delic was in charge of organizing
the day-to-day affairs of the camp and assisting the commander in
arranging for interrogation of prisoners.'96 Still, the tribunal could
not pin superior responsibility on these actions, emphasizing that
his assistance in organizing daily activities did not "indicate that
he had actual command authority in the sense that he could issue
would necessarily fail to prove Delic liable. See id. Furthermore, the defense argued
that the prosecution could not prove that Mucic was absent and Delic acted as
commander during the times when individual offenses were alleged to have occurred.
See id.
,go
See id. at 285 ("Notwithstanding the submissions of the Defence, the Prosecution
does not argue that the doctrine of command responsibility applies to those who do not
exercise command and asserts as a matter of fact that the evidence demonstrates that
Hazim Delic did exercise command in the Celebici prison-camp.").
19, See id. at 285-89.
For example, one eyewitness stated, "I asked, 'who is this
192 See id. at 285-86.
man?', and the people who were already sitting there said it was Hazim Delic, he is
number two, he is God and your life depends on him." Id. at 286.
193 See id. at 286 ("While this evidence is relevant to the Trial Chamber's
consideration, it is not dispositive of Mr. Delic's status.").
194

See id. at 287.

195 See id. at 288. The tribunal indicated that compliance of the guards may have
resulted from intimidation by Delic, and not from actual command authority. See id.
196

See id. at 289.
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orders and punish and prevent the criminal acts of subordinates."'97
After examining all the evidence, the tribunal concluded that
the prosecution had not met its burden in establishing Delic as a
superior with the power to prevent or punish acts of his
subordinates.'" Accordingly, Delic was not convicted of any war
crimes in his capacity as deputy commander of Celebici.' 99 Delic
was found guilty, however, of several crimes in which he was
allegedly a direct participant, including murder. 0t
E. SuperiorResponsibility of Zdravko Mucic
Mucic was alleged to have been the commander of Celebici,
and as such, was charged as a superior for every offense contained
in the indictment.2 ' As in the case of Hazim Delic, the tribunal
first considered evidence of whether Mucic was indeed a superior
with authority over the camp's prison guards before it examined
the facts of the underlying offenses. °2
The prosecution presented both eyewitness testimony and
documentary evidence that demonstrated Mucic was indeed
Celebici's commander during the period in which the atrocities
took place. 23 The witnesses, mainly former prisoners, stated that
Mucic was generally known as the camp commander. 24 The
evidence included documents from the Bosnian Army indicating
that Mucic was commander of the prison camp.05 Furthermore,
197

Id.

198See id. The tribunal judge found that the
Prosecution has failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt, that Hazim Delic
lay within the chain of command in the Celebici prison camp, with the power to
issue orders to subordinates or to prevent or punish criminal acts of
subordinates. Accordingly, he cannot be found to have been a "superior" for the
purposes of ascribing criminal responsibility to him under Article 7(3) of the
Statute.
Id.
199See id. at 443-46.
200 See id.
20, See id. at 262. The ramifications of this level of potential liability were huge,
given the offenses, ranging from murder to torture to rape. See id. at 461-76.
202 See id. at 262.
203

See id. at 263.

204

See id.

205

See id.

196
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the prosecution alleged that conditions were such at Celebici that
Mucic knew that violations were taking place. To prove this, the
prosecution pointed out that the prisoners suffered visible injuries,
and Mucic neither inquired into their cause, nor took reasonable
steps to prevent guards from abusing prisoners.07
The defense countered the prosecution's assertions by arguing
alternative facts. First, the defense pointed out the absence of
official records appointing Mucic commander of Celebici and
argued that the prosecution could not prove what responsibilities
or duties he held within the camp.08 Furthermore, the defense
alleged that different military and non-military groups had access
to the camp, and it was not proven that Mucic had any command
authority over these various groups.2°9 Finally, the defense
asserted that Mucic did not have the requisite knowledge of, or a
duty to prevent, war crimes, and he did what he could to prevent
mistreatment of individuals.1 °
Given the positions of both sides, the tribunal stressed again
the essence of command responsibility as embodied in the
superior-subordinate relationship, as evidenced by an actual
exercise of authority and power of control, even without formal
211
In the words of the tribunal, "where there is de
appointment.
facto control and actual exercise of command, the absence of a de
jure authority is irrelevant to the question of the superior's
criminal responsibility for the criminal acts of his subordinates. '212
With that proposition in mind, the tribunal examined carefully the
defense argument and found that by insisting that Mucic did what
he could to prevent mistreatment of prisoners, the defense
conceded that he had some type of authority over Celebici prison

206

See id. at 264.

207See id.
08 See id. at 265 ("Specifically, the Defence asserts that it has not been proven
whether Mr. Mucic was a military commander or a civilian warden or administrator, nor
what powers were given to him to investigate and punish those who mistreated
detainees.").
209 See id.
210 See id. The defense contended that Mucic gave orders not to mistreat the
prisoners. See id.
211 See id. at 267.
212

Id.
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guards." 3 Furthermore, because the defense argued that the
absence of formal authority should relieve Mucic from command
responsibility, an argument the tribunal explicitly rejected in
adopting a de facto approach, the tribunal found the defense's
argument to lack legal merit. 1 4 After analyzing the considerable
witness testimony produced by the prosecution, the tribunal
concluded that Mucic had superior authority over the prisoners
and guards in Celebici prison camp."'
Having found the existence of de facto command, the
tribunal's next step was to consider Mucic's knowledge of the
The tribunal examined evidence of both the
offenses." 6
widespread nature of the torture and mistreatment at Celebici and
the testimony of several eyewitnesses who claimed Mucic was
present during their torture. 21 In the end, the tribunal did not have
trouble concluding that Mucic had the requisite level of
knowledge; given the "frequent and notorious" nature of the
way that
crimes committed, the tribunal decided "there [was] no
218
Mr. Mucic could not have known or heard about them.,

The final element of the tripartite standard for command
responsibility is the commander's failure to act. 219 Again, the
tribunal had little trouble concluding that Mucic failed to take the
220
In
necessary measures to prevent or punish crimes at Celebici .
213

See id. at 268.

See id. at 269. "The Defence misconceives the correct legal position when it
assumes that 'without the formal authority' Mr. Mucic 'has no duty to maintain peace
and order within Celebici.' Id.
215 See id. at 271-272.
214

216

See id. at 276.

id. at 276-77. For example, one prisoner claimed that Mucic was present
when he was placed in a manhole, where he was to remain for seven days without food
or water. See id. at 276. Other prisoners claimed Mucic was present when they were
released from this manhole, after a period of confinement. See id. at 277.
218 See id. at 277. The tribunal based Mucic's actual knowledge on the widespread
nature of the crimes themselves, which is reminiscent of the situation in Yamashita. See
supra notes 96-115 and accompanying text. The crucial difference is that the ICTY used
the nature of the crimes to conclude that Mucic had actual knowledge, not that he should
have known but failed to properly supervise in order to find out. See Celebici Judgment,
supra note 9, at 277.
219 See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
217 See

22oSee Celebici Judgment, supra note 9, at 278.
There is no doubt that Zdravko Mucic had the authority to prevent the violations

198
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reaching this conclusion, the tribunal cited evidence that Mucic
never punished guards,22' was frequently absent from the camp at
night, 2' and failed to enforce any instructions which he did happen
to give out. 2 3 Having found all three elements of the command
responsibility doctrine present, the tribunal concluded that Mucic
was indeed criminally responsible for the offenses of his
subordinates at Celebici.224
F. SuperiorResponsibility of Zejnil Delalic
The tribunal's discussion of Delalic's charge of command
responsibility was the most lengthy and complicated. 25 Delalic
was a direct participant in only one offense, the unlawful
confinement of civilians; the rest of his charges rested on the
command responsibility doctrine.226
The analysis of his
responsibility was complicated by the fact that Delalic occupied
more than one position of command; he was a regional coordinator
of the Konjic area for a period and later was appointed commander
of Tactical Group 1.227
The prosecution asserted that although Delalic was not
formally designated as a commander of Celebici, his command
over the Konjic region placed him in a position of authority over
Mucic and consequently the guards in the prison camp. 221
Furthermore, the prosecution contended that, even if Delalic did
not exercise direct authority over the camp's personnel, his
of international humanitarian law in the Celebici prison camp. There is no
evidence before the Trial Chamber that he made any serious effort to prevent
these continued violations or punish his subordinates for such crimes during his
tenure.

Id.
222

See id. at 277.
id. at 278.

222 See
223

See id.

224 See

id. at 279. The crimes that Mucic was charged with as a superior include
those described in note 182, supra.
223 Discussion of Delalic's alleged command responsibility encompassed 47 pages
of the opinion, compared with 11 for Delic and 18 for Mucic. See id. at 215-89.
226 See supra note 182 (discussing some of the crimes committed by guards at
Celebici, for which Delalic was allegedly responsible).
227 See Celebici Judgment, supra note 9, at 216. Tactical Group 1 was a military
unit of the Bosnian Muslim forces. See id.
228 See id. at 217.
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position of authority within the Konjic region vested him with

responsibility for the offenses perpetrated within Celebici. 9 To
support these contentions, the prosecution produced evidence
tending to show that Delalic was considered to be a commander of
Celebici both in his role as regional coordinator, 3 and by virtue of
his position as commander of Tactical Group 123'
The defense conceded that Delalic had occupied these
positions, but argued that he did not have authority or control over
the personnel at Celebici prison camp."' In his position as
coordinator, the defense argued, Delalic acted in an administrative
capacity and not as a commander.233 Furthermore, the defense
argued that although Delalic was commander of Tactical Group 1,
no member of the staff of Celebici was in this military unit.14 Any
orders that Delalic may have issued to the Celebici personnel, the
defense asserted, were transmitted from a higher command and not
specifically ordered by Delalic in his capacity as commander.3
Before analyzing the factual evidence in support of each side,
the tribunal discussed some of the legal issues.236 Namely, the

229

See id. at 218.

In [the prosecution's] view, it is clear that [Delalic] was one of the leading
figures of authority in the region at that time, and that his power and influence
extended to matters pertaining to the Celebici prison-camp and at the very least
to the classification and release of detainees.
Id.
230 See id. at 218-20. For example, the prosecution cited evidence that in his role as
regional coordinator, Delalic visited the prison camp and was given the deference
expected by a commander. See id. at 220.
231 See id. at 220-24. The prosecution contended that the order designating Delalic
as commander of Tactical Group 1 made him the commander of all troops in the region,
including those stationed as guards at Celebici. See id. at 220. The prosecution further
argued that Delalic continued to exercise the same level of authority in this new role, as
he had as regional commander. See id. at 221.
232 See id. at 225.
233 See id. at 227 ("In the view of the Defence, co-ordination implies, by definition,
mediation and conciliation, and does not connote command authority or superior
authority.").
234 See id. at 229.

See id. ("Mr. Delalic, on these occasions, acted merely as a conduit and that he
transmitted these orders pursuant to orders issued to him by the Supreme Command.").
convenient and appropriate to
236 See id. at 231-32 ("The Trial Chamber deems it
discuss a few preliminary issues which it considers necessary for the elucidation of its
235
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tribunal expressed its concern with the prosecution's apparent
contention that Delalic, as a superior, could be held criminally
responsible even without establishing a chain of command or the
existence of subordinates under his control:
The view of the Prosecution that a person may, in the absence of
a subordinate unit through which the authority is exercised,
incur responsibility for the exercise of superior authority seems
to the Trial Chamber a novel proposition clearly at variance with
the principle of command responsibility. The law does not know
of a universal superior without a corresponding subordinate. The
doctrine of command responsibility is clearly articulated and
anchored on the relationshipbetween superiorand subordinate,
and the responsibility of the commanderfor actions of members

of his troops. It is a species of vicarious responsibility through
which military discipline is regulated and ensured. This is why a

subordinate unit of the superior or commander is a sine qua non
for superior responsibility. 237

Having emphasized this point, the tribunal then examined
Delalic's activities to determine if the superior-subordinate
relationship did indeed exist. 238

In examining his duties as

coordinator, the tribunal found that this position did not confer
command responsibility upon Delalic. 239

Rather, the tribunal

found that as coordinator, his duties consisted of "mediation and
conciliation" and that he had "his functions prescribed.,

240

The

tribunal also found that the role of coordinator was not recognized
in the Bosnian military, and that Delalic, as coordinator, was not
part of a military chain of command.24 '

Rather, he acted as a

mediator between military and civilian groups in the Bosnian
government and exercised no independent judgment. 242 Therefore,
the tribunal concluded that Delalic did not acquire command
responsibility by virtue of his role as coordinator in the Konjic
municipality.243
reasoning.").
237

Id. at 232 (emphasis added).

238 See

id. at 233-61.

See id. at 249.
240 Id. at 238.
24, See id.
242 See id.
239

243 See id. at 249. In reaching this conclusion, the tribunal rejected evidence such as
Delalic's signature on various written orders to Celebici personnel, and activities such as

1999]

COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY DOCTRINE

201

Next the tribunal looked at Delalic's activities in his capacity
as commander of Tactical Group 1.244 First, the tribunal pointed
out that Tactical Group 1 was strictly a temporary combat unit,
and did not include non-combat institutions such as prisons. 245
Next, the tribunal examined the prosecution's key evidence as to
Delalic's authority over Celebici, which was a set of orders issued
to the commander of Celebici requiring him to appoint a
commission to interrogate prisoners. 246 The tribunal, however,
rejected the prosecution's contention that the issuance of these
orders provided incontrovertible proof of Delalic's authority over
Celebici. 24' Rather, the tribunal focused on the nature of a tactical
group,• •which
exists only to carry out specific, combat-related
248
missions. Any exercise of authority outside that narrow mission
would have to be conferred from some higher source.2 49 Thus, the
tribunal concluded, Delalic acted as a conduit in transmitting those
orders to the Celebici commander from the Bosnian Supreme
Command. 2 ' ° The tribunal also relied on evidence of the limited
nature of Delalic's command to defeat or reject the prosecution's
contention that Delalic was a regional commander, and thereby
acquired the Celebici camp as part of his command.'
Having examined Delalic's functions as coordinator and
tactical commander and finding no existence of authority over
issuing uniforms. See id. at 246-48. The tribunal found that these activities were
consistent with his administrative and logistical functions and did not imply any exercise
of authority or command. See id.
244

245

See id. at 249-61.
See id. at 249.

-, See id. at 251.
These orders, issued by Delalic, "required the Military
Investigating body of the Konjic OSOS to undertake interrogation of prisoners at
Celebici. It required Zdravko Mucic to establish a commission of three members to
undertake the interrogation of prisoners." Id.
247
248

See id. at 255.
See id. at 251-52.

249 See id. at 252 ("The commander of a tactical group, when so ordered by his
superior, must perform missions or tasks outside the scope of his specific authority as a
tactical group commander.").
250 See id. ("These are not the orders of Mr. Delalic, who, as commander of
[Tactical Group 1], could not issue any orders outside those concerning his command.
Mr. Delalic was in this case performing as a mere conduit or a ministerial functionary.").
251 See id. at 253 ("The commander of [Tactical Group 1] had authority only over
the formations that were directly subordinated to him by order of the Supreme
Command.").
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Celebici in either of these roles, the tribunal concluded that Delalic
could not be held responsible as a commander for the acts
committed by prison guards within Celebici.2 5 ' Again, the tribunal
reiterated that international law did not allow a commander to be
held responsible for acts of individuals not within his command.253
Ultimately, the tribunal also found Delalic not guilty on his one
direct charge, unlawful confinement of civilians.254
G. Analysis of the ICTY's Application of the Command
Responsibility Doctrine
Now that the tribunal's decisions in relation to the command
responsibility of the three accused have been summarized, it is
appropriate to compare these decisions with the development of
the command responsibility doctrine discussed in this Comment.
First, in regard to Hazim Delic, it is apparent that the tribunal was
quite strict in its formulation of de facto command. The evidence
tended to show that Delic, as deputy commander, did indeed order
the prison guards around, and they generally obeyed his orders.'
The tribunal, however, was careful to make the distinction
between compliance achieved through fear and bullying and the
exercise of actual authority.256 Although the de facto doctrine
allows for even informal commanders to be held responsible, these
commanders still must exercise the same type of authority as a de
jure commander.5 One could argue that the very fact that Delic
had to resort to bullying and intimidation indicates that he did not

252

See id. at 261.

253

See id.

The courts have not accepted the proposition that a commander be held
responsible for the war crimes of persons not under his command. In the instant
case, the Trial Chamber has found that the Prosecution has failed to prove that
Mr. Delalic had command authority and, therefore, superior responsibility over
Celebici prison camp, its commander, deputy commander or guards. Mr. Delalic
cannot, therefore, be held responsible for the crimes alleged to have been
committed in the Celebici prison-camp by Zdravko Mucic, Hazim Delic, Esad
Landzo or other persons within the Celebici prison-camp.
ld.
254

See id. at 440.

255 See

id. at 281-82.

26

See id. at 288.

27

See id. at 139-40.
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have legitimate authority over the prison guards.
If the analysis of Delic's responsibility serves to underscore
the importance of the element of command and control, the
tribunal's discussion of Delalic's responsibility emphasizes the
significance of the superior-subordinate relationship.
The
prosecution and defense both admitted that Delalic was indeed a
commander in the usual sense of the word, especially when he
took command of Tactical Group 1.2 8 The fatal flaw in the
prosecution's case, however, was their inability to prove that the
prison guards at Celebici were in any way Delalic's
subordinates. 2 9 The essential element is not whether a commander
controls a certain geographic area, but whether he controls the
individuals who commit the war crimes. This approach may seem
at odds with the Yamashita decision, in which General
Yamashita's overall responsibility for the Philippines was a key
factor in finding him criminally responsible for the actions of
Japanese soldiers in that region.2' 6 However, the difference lies in
the charge involved. General Yamashita was charged with a
failure to discharge his duty as commander, which would have
required him to control his troops and prevent their commission of
atrocities.261 Under the facts of Yamashita, assuming the charge
was proper, his conviction seems rightly decided. On the other
hand, Delalic was charged with the underlying offenses of the
guards at Celebici, including rape, torture, and murder.262 He was
not alleged to have directly participated in any of these acts.
In
this situation, the establishment of a superior-subordinate
relationship would have been a necessary prerequisite to pinning
any liability on Delalic. 4
Yet, Mucic's conviction demonstrates the classic operation of
the command responsibility doctrine. His actions fit the three
elements of the command responsibility doctrine perfectly.265

258

See supra notes 230-32 and accompanying text.

259
260

See supra notes 245-51 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 103-07 and accompanying text.

261

See supra note 103 and accompanying text.

262

See supra note 226 and accompanying text.

263 See

id.

264 See

supra note 236 and accompanying text.

265

See supra notes 150-51 and accompanying text.
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Mucic was inarguably the commander of Celebici, he did not act
to prevent or punish the prison guards' atrocities, and he knew that
these atrocities were taking place. 266 This last element provides
some insight into the tribunal's theory of how the command
responsibility doctrine should operate. The tribunal imputed
actual knowledge to Mucic after examining the evidence that
torture and beatings were doled out frequently at Celebici, and that
the prisoners were constantly in a state of injury.267 In effect, this
decision tells commanders that they may not choose to avoid the
obvious or their knowledge will be presumed. This gives some
1.261
teeth to the "willful blindness" doctrine embodied in Protocol
In more general terms, the Celebici decision indicates the
utility of the command responsibility doctrine in light of the
circumstances of modem warfare. The shift from international
toward internal conflict that made Protocols I and II so appropriate
in the late 1970S2 69 also increases the need for a system of
enforcing the responsibility of leaders outside the formal military
structure. The de facto arm of the command responsibility
doctrine, articulated for the first time in the international context in
270
the Celebicijudgment, directly addresses this need.
This is not to say, however, that the Celebici formulation of
the command responsibility doctrine is perfect. It has the potential
danger of creating extensive liability for an especially poor or dull
commander, one who lacks the expertise, influence, or experience
to effectively control his subordinates. In such a case, it is
possible that a conviction would appear to fault the commander
more for his lack of know-how than for a true disregard for
humanity or the law.2 7' Since neither the tribunal's three-part
formulation of the command responsibility doctrine nor the

266

See supra notes 217-23 and accompanying text.

267 See
268

See supra notes 117-25 and accompanying text.

269 See
270

Celebici Judgment, supra note 9, at 277.
supra notes 63-66 and accompanying text.

See supra notes 160-62 and accompanying text.

See supra note 172 and accompanying text. The tribunal noted it could only
impose a duty upon commanders to do what is "within his material possibility," but it did
not speak to whether the individual's intelligence or skill was a factor in determining
what is materially possible. Celebici Judgment, supra note 9, at 147. However, the
tribunal did consider the mental state of Esad Landzo, one of the defendants not charged
with superior responsibility, in determining a sentence. See id. at 438.
271
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opinion itself discusses this possibility, it will be up to future
tribunals to determine how to resolve this issue. Nonetheless,
despite this potential drawback, the ICTY's definition of the
command responsibility doctrine is relevant, extensively
explained,272 and most importantly, has been applied in practice to
three very different defendants.
IV. Conclusion
This Comment has provided a broad summary of the
development of laws of war, especially during the last two
centuries. It has also discussed the emergence of the command
responsibility doctrine and its most recent application in the ICTY.
The tribunal's thorough discussion of the doctrine in general, and
its careful application of the doctrine to three very different types
of commanders, provides a valuable precedent to war crimes
tribunals in the future (national and international). Furthermore,
the ICTY's acknowledgement of Protocol I of the Geneva
Conventions as a primary source of international law confers
weight and authority upon that treaty, even though several
international superpowers, including the United States, Great
Britain, France, and Japan, have not ratified it.273 The future will
undoubtedly see further application of the command responsibility
doctrine, both in international war and internal armed conflicts.
Like any doctrine in the laws of war, however, the command
responsibility doctrine must remain flexible, as the nature of
warfare inevitably changes over time.
ANN

B. CHING

272 The tribunal's discussion of the correct formulation of the doctrine covers nearly
29 pages of the 484-page opinion. See id. at 121-49.
273 See REISMAN, supra note 57, at 415-16, 428.

